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Abstract
In 2011-2015 global trade volumes have systematically surprised on the downside,
to a much larger extent than real GDP. We show that two key features of real trade
ows  their high volatility and their procyclicality  determine a cyclicality of the
income elasticity of trade. This property is such that when real GDP growth is positive
but lower than its long-run trend, then the income elasticity of trade is also smaller
than its own long-run trend. As a consequence, when real GDP growth turns out to be
weaker than expected, the forecast error on trade volumes is amplied by the fact that
also the income elasticity of trade happens to be smaller than predicted. Our analysis
shows, in particular, that long-run and cyclical forces have contributed to a similar
extent to the recent weakness of trade volumes. As a by-product, we also explain how
the high volatility and procyclicality of real trade ows, together with the size of the
non-tradeable-goods sector, contribute to determine cross-country di¤erences in the
income elasticity of trade.
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1 Introduction
In the quinquennium 2011-2015, global trade has regularly disappointed expectations.
Figure 1 shows, for example, that while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) esti-
mated world trade volumes to grow at an annual average of 5:3%, their actual growth
rate turned out to be just 3:6% per year. World trade growth fell short of expectations
in each year of the quinquennium, by a size ranging from 0:9 percentage points in 2011
to almost 3 points in 2012.1 While this systematic forecast error has reected, in part,
lower-than-expected real GDP growth, the economic and policy debate has focused on
the surprising fall of the income elasticity of trade  here dened as the ratio between
real import growth and real GDP growth ("income elasticity" hereafter).2 Income
elasticity has, in fact, decreased from a predicted level of 1:4 (a value in line with its
historical average), to around 1:0, accounting for more than half of the forecast error.3
The recent dismal performance of international trade has originated a new wave
of theoretical and empirical studies, similarly to what happened during the so-called
Great Trade Collapse of 2008-09.4 As in that episode, the post-crisis weakness of foreign
trade has been attributed to a resurgence of protectionist measures, to a shortening of
global value chains, to the persistence of nancial problems a¤ecting trade credit, or
to possible composition e¤ects, due either to geographic or to sectoral factors. More
recent contributions have also argued that the income elasticity can be larger than
1The IMF was not alone in overestimating world trade. The forecast errors made by other inter-
national nancial institutions, such as the OECD and the WTO, were, in fact, of the same sign and
of similar magnitude.
2Throughout the paper we will focus only on the income elasticity of trade using the ratio between
the growth rate of real imports at the numerator and the growth rate of real GDP at the denominator.
At the world level, focusing on imports or exports is essentially the same thing, although, in practice,
the two variables are never completely identical, due to statistical discrepancies. In the period 1980-
2015, for example, IMF data report that the di¤erence between the annual growth of real exports and
that of real imports was between  1:7 (in 1994) and 2:8 percentage points (in 1980), although it was
on average nil over the whole period. Similarly, in 2011-2015 the di¤erence was in a range between
 0:2 and 0:3 percentage points and was on average nil in the quinquennium. At the country level,
focusing on imports or exports makes a more signicant di¤erence. Yet, using one or the other leaves
the main results of this paper unaltered, due to the strong correlation between import and export
volumes, documented by Engel and Wang (2011). Analogously, placing at the denominator the growth
rate of GDP or that of domestic demand provides very similar, albeit not identical, results.
3Real GDP growth fell short of expectations by an annual average of 0:5 percentage points in 2011-
2015. By using the elasticity of 1:4 implicit in the IMF forecasts, lower GDP growth then accounted
for 0:7 percentage points of the forecast error. Hence, the remaining percentage point, i.e. about 60%
of the forecast error, is accounted for by the decline of the income elasticity of trade.
4Most hypotheses about the causes of the Great Trade Collapse have been presented in Baldwin
(2009) and Baldwin and Evenett (2009); for other important contributions not included in those books,
see also Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2016) and the extensive literature surveyed therein.
Hoekman (2016) gathers several explanations for the post-crisis performance of trade; for other views,
see also Borin and Mancini (2015) and IMF (2016).
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Figure 1: Forecast errors on the growth of world import and world GDP volumes (1)
(1) Percentage-point di¤erence between the growth rate at year t as measured in the IMF
WEO (World Economic Outlook) published in October at year t + 1 (actual data) and the
growth rate at year t as predicted in the IMF WEO published in October at year t   1
(forecast). Actual data for the year 2015 are from the IMF WEO published in April 2016.
Source: our elaborations on IMF data.
1 only to the extent that trade volumes grow faster that real GDP, as they do, for
example, when trade barriers decline. If, instead, trade volumes and real GDP grow
at the same speed, then the income elasticity should lie at the equilibrium level of
1. Its post-crisis reduction is then interpreted as a return to its equilibrium value, as
the secular decline in tari¤ and non-tari¤ protectionist measures and in transportation
costs is gradually waning (see Gaulier, Mayer, Steingress and Zignago, 2016).
In this paper we suggest a new explanation, complementary to the one that
focuses solely on the role of trade barriers and other structural factors: we argue that
the level of the income elasticity is a¤ected not only by a long-run trend, but also
by business cycle conditions. Specically, we show that, even when trade volumes
and GDP grow at identical (and positive) rates in the long-run, in the short-run one
should expect a greater income elasticity when GDP growth is strong and a smaller
income elasticity when GDP growth is weak. This e¤ect can cyclically bring the income
elasticity above 1, even in the absence of changes in trade barriers.
The cyclicality of the income elasticity, which emerges even if trade volumes and
real GDP increase at identical long-run rates, is the consequence of two standard prop-
erties of real trade ows (and, in particular, of imports), documented in the literature
on the international real business cycle and revisited in this paper. Namely, their high
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volatility and their procyclicality.5
To provide a rst intuitive example of why these two properties may push the
income elasticity above 1, suppose for a moment that the trend growth rates of GDP
and import volumes are both nil. If real import growth is more volatile than real GDP
growth, then when the latter is positive, the former is either positive and very high or
negative and very low. But the positive correlation between import and GDP volumes
suggests that the relevant case is the one in which the two growth rates have the same
sign. By the same token, when real GDP growth is negative, real import growth is also
negative and very low. Thus, at a positive (negative) real GDP growth corresponds a
positive (negative) and higher (lower) real import growth. In other words, the income
elasticity can settle at a value that is greater than 1.
Now let us consider the more relevant case in which both GDP and import vol-
umes have a positive trend growth. To separate the "pure trend e¤ect" on the income
elasticity related to declining trade barriers (i.e. to imports growing faster than GDP),
suppose that these trend growth rates are identical, say set at 3%. In addition, to
build a simple intuition about the reasons why the income elasticity is a¤ected by the
business cycle, let us also focus only on positive growth rates. As real import growth
is more volatile than and positively correlated with real GDP growth, when the latter
is above its average (say 4%), the former is even higher (say 5%); when real GDP
growth is instead low (say 2%), real import growth is even lower (say 1%). The income
elasticity is then greater than 1 when real GDP growth is high, and smaller than 1
when real GDP growth is low (respectively 5=4 and 1=2 in our simple example). Thus,
the income elasticity is procyclical.
While this intuitive example works well in a neighborhood of the trend growth
rate of real imports and real GDP (provided that real GDP growth is not zero, a
value at which the elasticity is not dened), in the whole domain of these variables the
relationship between the income elasticity and the business cycle is more complex and
necessitates a full-edged model to be illustrated. Procyclicality, for example, does not
hold across the full spectrum of growth rates. Yet, two results keep standing out also
in the more general case: (1) business cycle conditions a¤ect the level of the income
elasticity; (2) high volatility and positive correlation of imports with GDP will, in
particular, cyclically bring the elasticity to levels above its long-run trend.
To develop our argument, we proceed in three steps. In the rst step, we consider
a sample of 161 advanced and emerging economies and, using annual data from 1970
5Because the volumes of trade ows and GDP increase over time, the international real business
cycle literature consider HP ltered series. As the focus of our paper is the income elasticity, which is
a ratio between growth rates, our empirical analysis will tackle the time trend by focusing on growth
rates, complementing that literature. Thus, in particular, by high volatility of imports we mean that
the standard deviation of real import growth is higher than that of real GDP growth. Similarly, with
procyclicality we refer to the positive contemporaneous correlation of real import growth with the
business cycle (as measured by the growth rate of real GDP or of real investment).
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to 2015, we describe two sets of stylized facts. The former set includes the facts that
we intend to explain; namely: the income elasticity is on average greater than 1 and
positively correlated with the business cycle. While the fact that the income elasticity
tends to be greater than 1 conrms the ndings of previous literature (which we review
in the next section), its positive correlation with the business cycle is for the rst
time documented in this paper. The latter set describes two standard features of open
economies that are key to explain the former set: the growth rate of real imports is
more volatile than that of real GDP and is positively correlated with the business cycle.
In the second step, we consider a simple theoretical model of international trade,
based on Bems, Johnson and Yi (2013), with the purpose of deriving the main empirical
implications about the level and cyclical properties of the income elasticity. We start by
showing that in the standard case in which all goods are tradeable (one-sector model),
the income elasticity is not a¤ected by the business cycle. In this context, it is greater
(smaller) than 1 if and only if trade barriers decrease (increase), otherwise it is equal
to 1. We then consider tradeable and non-tradeable goods (two-sector model) and
assume, consistently with the facts discussed above, that the former are more volatile
than, and correlated with, the latter. We prove two main results. First, if the trend
growth rates of the volumes of tradeable and non-tradeable goods are nil, then the
income elasticity is persistently greater than 1, even in the absence of a decline in
trade barriers. Second, if tradeables and non-tradeables have instead a positive trend
growth, then the income elasticity is a¤ected by the cycle. In particular, the income
elasticity is procyclical for both positive and negative growth rates of real GDP, even
though not across the whole spectrum of growth rates, as it is not dened when real
GDP growth is zero, while in the neighborhood of zero it approaches innity.
In the last step, we analyze the implications of the model concerning the behavior
of the income elasticity in the cross-section of countries as well as over time. In
particular, for the time-series analysis we turn to world trade and nd that the trend
component of the income elasticity has recently been approaching 1, as conjectured in
the recent literature. At the same time, however, weak world GDP growth has brought
the elasticity below its current trend, i.e. below 1. Our analysis then shows that long-
run and cyclical forces have contributed to a similar extent to the recently observed
weakness of trade volumes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the litera-
ture. Section 3 presents the main stylized facts. Section 4 analyzes a simple theoretical
framework. Section 5 discusses the main implications of the model. Section 6 summa-
rizes the main conclusions and o¤ers some suggestions for future research.
2 Related literature
The study of the elasticities of trade to either prices or income has a long tradition in
international economics, the classic example being the Marshall-Lerner condition. The
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existing literature, however, has focused exclusively on the level of the elasticities, while
their business cycle properties have been generally overlooked. In a pioneering paper,
for example, Houthakker and Magee (1969) estimated the value of the income elasticity
of imports and exports for a number of economies, with the purpose of analyzing their
di¤erences across countries  a possible source of balance-of-payments problems in old-
Keynesian approaches. Their empirical analysis documented that the income elasticity
of imports was larger than 1 for essentially all the countries included in their sample,
although with relevant cross-country di¤erences.6
Previous studies have also analyzed the behavior of the income elasticity across
very long time spans, relating them to the evolution of trade barriers, as reected in
changes either in tari¤ and non-tari¤ policies or in transportation costs. Irwin (2002),
in particular, analyzed the income elasticity for the world economy since 1870, distin-
guishing three main phases: (i) in the pre-World War I era (1870-1913), characterized
by very stable tari¤ rates (which were also very low in Western Europe), the elasticity
tended to lie around 1; (ii) in the interwar era (1920-1938), the rise of protectionism
and the introduction of foreign exchange restrictions brought the elasticity down, to
levels close to zero; (iii) in the post-World War II era (1950-2000), when the GATT
and the WTO encouraged a sustained reduction in trade barriers, the elasticity rose
well above 1. Interestingly, a study by the World Bank (1987) with data going back to
1720 nds that the period in which the income elasticity reached its peak was between
1820 to 1870, when a sharp fall of freight costs occurred, favored by a wide di¤usion
of railways and steamships as well as by the wave of trade liberalizations that followed
the Napoleonic wars. Our paper departs from previous studies by analyzing the income
elasticity at both the low and the business cycle frequencies.
Another strand of the literature related to our paper includes the studies focusing
on the international real business cycle. The classical paper by Backus, Kehoe and
Kydland (1995) documented the high volatility of imports (and exports) relative to
that of GDP. Heathcote and Perri (2002) add to that nding the sharp procyclicality
of trade ows. The paper that is closest to our own, however, is Engel andWang (2011),
who put the high volatility and procyclicality of imports and exports at the center stage
(together with their positive correlation). Their paper builds a model of international
real business cycle that reproduces these features of the data, by introducing two
di¤erent stochastic processes that generate technology shocks: a high-volatility process
for durable consumption goods (which are assumed to be tradeable) and a low-volatility
process for non-durable consumption goods (non-tradeable). It then simulates the
model and analyzes its implications for the price elasticity of trade. Our approach
is quite similar, as it assumes shocks with di¤erent volatility a¤ecting tradeable and
non-tradeable goods, but we build a much simpler model with the purpose of deriving
6Another classical reference is Hooper, Johnson and Marquez (2000), who updated Houthakker
and Magee (1969) and provided an extensive analysis of income as well as price elasticities of imports
and exports for the G-7 countries, using data from the mid-1950 to the mid-1990s.
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an analytical expression for the income elasticity of trade.7
Our paper also contributes to the debate concerning the weakness of trade that
rst emerged during the global crisis of 2008-09 and then persisted during the subse-
quent economic recovery. Within this very extensive literature (briey recalled in the
previous section), the contributions that are most closely related to our own are those
of Bems, Johnson and Yi (2013) and Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2016). The
former work (from which we borrow the theoretical framework) relates the sharp fall of
trade relative to GDP in 2008-09 to the composition of expenditure and, in particular,
to the fact that the global recession saw an especially large decline in the production
of highly-traded durable goods as opposed to that of lowly-traded services. The lat-
ter study builds an extremely rich framework by embedding a multi-sectoral general
equilibrium model of trade into a multi-country real business cycle model. Their quan-
tication shows that a shock hitting e¢ ciency in the durable-goods sector provided
the major contribution to the fall of trade relative to GDP recorded in 2008-09. Our
paper suggests that the same mechanisms are more generally at work also outside the
single episode of the global recession. In other words, the higher volatility and the
procyclicality of tradeable goods normally determine an income elasticity that varies
along the business cycle. This cyclical component adds to the trend component, which
is instead determined by changes in trade policies and transportation costs that occur
at lower frequencies.
The di¤erent cyclical behavior of the various components of aggregate demand,
together with their di¤erent import content, is also central to the analysis of Bussière,
Callegari, Ghironi, Sestieri and Yamano (2013). These authors note that investment
and exports, which are more procyclical, have a higher import content than consump-
tion and government spending, which are less procyclical. As a result, by focusing on
the Great Trade Collapse, these authors show that trade tends to fall more that GDP
during recessions, a result which corresponds to a larger-than-unity income elasticity.
In this paper we expand over this idea by showing that the di¤erent cyclicality of GDP
and imports imply a cyclicality of the income elasticity. This is such that trade not only
falls more than GDP during recessions, but increases more than GDP during strong
expansions and increases less than GDP during weak expansions.
Our paper is also related to the empirical literature that uses Error Correction
Models (ECMs) in order to estimate a long-run and a short-run income elasticity. In
the context of international trade, however, ECMs are a¤ected by two main problems.
The rst is that these models assume a stable long-run relationship between income
and trade ows, whereas changing trade barriers would instead imply a time-varying
7The high volatility and procyclicality of trade ows could be generated not only by the di¤erent
volatility of the processes generating durables and non-durables, as in Engel and Wang (2011), but also
by inventory adjustment, as in Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2015), or simply by consumption
smoothing, as trade is less intensive than GDP in consumption expenditure. In our paper, however,
we focus only on the consequences of these two features, irrespectively of their underlying causes.
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long-run relationship. For this reason, recent papers such as Constantinescu, Mattoo
and Ruta (2015) estimate ECMs over rolling 10-year windows. This solution partially
addresses the problem a¤ecting the long-run income elasticity, which, in facts, turns
out to be similar to the trend elasticity that we derive from our model. It does not ad-
dresses, however, the second problem, which is the assumption of a constant short-run
impact of income on trade ows. Our analysis shows, in fact, that the contemporaneous
response of imports to income is cyclical a result that cannot emerge by estimating a
short-run elasticity over a 10-year rolling windows, a time-span during which cyclical
e¤ects are net out.
Finally, our analysis contributes to reconcile the ndings of the recent literature,
which documents the decline of the income elasticity in the current weak conjuncture,
with those of Freund (2009), who instead shows that the income elasticity tends to be
high in global downturns. Our results, in fact, demonstrate the non-linearity of the
response of trade to GDP. In particular, income elasticity is high for large negative
cyclical shocks, such as those that take place during strong recessions, as well as for
positive shocks, and it is instead low for small negative shocks, such as when GDP
growth is weak, but still positive.
3 Stylized facts
In this section we use annual data from the IMF, in order to document both the facts
that we intend to explain and those that will serve as assumptions for the theoretical
model.8 We consider two di¤erent groups of countries. One is the full sample of
161 advanced, emerging and developing economies, and includes annual data on GDP,
investment and trade ows (all at constant prices). The other is a restricted sample of
35 OECD countries, for which available data on volumes are usually of better quality
and for which we have performed robustness tests using, in addition to annual data,
also quarterly data (until the fourth quarter of 2015).
We want to stress that the results presented in this section are extremely robust to
the choice of the data source, the sample of countries, the time period, and the method
used to retrieve volumes from values. Results are, in fact, conrmed using data from
the World Bank for 148 countries starting in 1960 (World Bank, 2016) and data from
the Penn World Table for 167 countries, which go back to 1950 and consider volumes
evaluated at 2005 Geary-Khamis dollars (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2015).9
8We use data from the April 2016 release of the World Economic Outlook (WEO), which go back
to 1980 and which we extend back to 1970 using an older release of the WEO (May 2003).
9A version of the tables 1 and 2 presented in this section and obtained using these two alternative
data sources are available from the authors upon request.
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3.1 Properties of the income elasticity
The income elasticity of trade is computed, for each country and year, as the ratio
between the growth rates of import and GDP volumes. It is important to recall that
the elasticity is not dened when the denominator is zero. Although real GDP growth is
never exactly equal to zero, at the country level it is relatively close to this value in some
cases. The extreme values that the elasticity takes in those cases would strongly distort
summary statistics. For example, in our sample the elasticity is between  10 and 10
for more than 90% of the observations. Yet, there are a few observations in which the
elasticity is above 1; 000 (or below  1; 000) which would completely distort standard
descriptive statistics, such as the mean, the variance and the linear correlation. For
this reason, this section will focus on robust statistics.
Table 1 reports the median value of the income elasticity for the restricted sample
of OECD countries (rst column). The elasticity is larger than 1 for all the countries
and its cross-country average is 2:1, the same value as the cross-country median.10
We obtain very similar statistics by using other methods to deal with the outliers.
In particular, we nd a cross-country average elasticity close to 2 also if we restrict
the analysis to the income elasticities computed only when the growth rate of GDP is
outside the interval [ 0:5; 0:5] as well as if we exclude the observations for which the
elasticity is larger than the absolute value of 10.
The statistics concerning the full sample are consistent with these ndings, al-
though elasticities turn out to be somewhat lower  an issue on which we return in
Section 5. The average of the median elasticities across all countries is 1:5 (just like the
cross-country median) and over 70% of the economies show a median income elasticity
above 1. In addition, di¤erent methods for dealing with the outliers provide similar
results.
We now turn to the relationship between the income elasticity and the business
cycle. This question entails an additional problem, besides that of dealing with the
outliers, which is the identication of an appropriate cyclical indicator. The growth rate
of GDP is, in fact, the denominator of the elasticity and, therefore, its increase entails,
ceteris paribus, a decrease of the elasticity, inducing a negative correlation. In principle,
one would like to analyze the cyclicality by considering the correlation of the elasticity
with the technology or demand shocks that drive the business cycle. Alternatively,
one can resort to the variables that are known to be mostly a¤ected by these shocks.
The sharp procyclicality of import volumes unveiled in the international business cycle
literature, for example, suggests that imports themselves are a candidate variable to
represent the cycle. By calculating the correlation between the income elasticity and
the growth rate of real imports, however, we would face the opposite problem: the
latter is the numerator of the income elasticity and its increase determines, ceteris
10To be precise, the reported values are the average of the country medians and the median of the
country medians.
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Table 1: Income elasticity: main facts
OECD countries: Median GDP Investment Imports
Australia 2.5 8.1 35.6 69.5
Austria 2.2 -21.5 8.5 55.9
Belgium 2.5 -23.6 -5.3 23.0
Canada 2.2 -15.6 0.0 35.9
Chile 2.1 -7.0 14.2 35.2
Czech Republic 2.4 29.6 27.5 56.4
Denmark 1.7 35.8 30.7 68.2
Estonia 2.0 -1.9 5.0 37.7
Finland 1.7 32.2 14.1 58.2
France 2.7 -24.2 -6.3 22.9
Germany 2.2 -0.6 9.2 46.2
Greece 1.7 21.6 47.2 49.3
Hungary 2.3 27.9 42.4 60.6
Iceland 1.8 -0.5 42.1 42.9
Ireland 1.7 5.9 16.1 50.2
Israel 1.2 30.9 47.3 78.8
Italy 2.9 9.2 12.9 47.3
Japan 2.2 9.6 6.6 43.4
Korea 1.6 -0.9 13.0 63.2
Latvia 1.4 19.7 57.8 19.2
Luxembourg 1.5 -4.3 14.4 33.6
Mexico 3.1 -4.4 9.7 34.5
Netherlands 2.0 -9.0 5.9 36.2
New Zealand 1.9 1.7 27.5 60.6
Norway 1.6 -36.6 27.2 51.7
Poland 2.0 35.4 49.3 51.5
Portugal 2.7 2.9 21.8 45.5
Slovak Republic 2.3 -51.7 -0.7 30.7
Slovenia 2.2 5.5 15.9 64.0
Spain 3.0 -11.9 -2.7 29.6
Sweden 1.8 15.0 34.1 39.8
Switzerland 2.0 -12.6 -0.4 49.5
Turkey 2.2 16.3 28.0 59.0
United Kingdom 2.2 -42.7 -14.8 32.9
United States 2.1 10.2 13.8 52.8
Summary statistics: OECD countries
Mean 2.1 1.4 18.5 46.7
Median 2.1 1.7 14.2 47.3
Min 1.2 -51.7 -14.8 19.2
Max 3.1 35.8 57.8 78.8
% >0 100 51 80 100
% >1 100 - - -
Summary statistics: full sample (161 countries)
Mean 1.5 4.6 20.3 53.9
Median 1.5 5.6 21.8 55.6
Min -0.3 -57.1 -71.4 -7.5
Max 3.5 61.5 66.7 97.3
% >0 99 61 84 98
% >1 74 - - -
Correlation with the growth rate of:
Source: authorscalculations on IMF annual data from 1970 to 2015.
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paribus, an increase in the elasticity, inducing a positive correlation. For this reason,
we use the growth rate of real investment as the main cyclical indicator.
Table 1 reports, for the restricted sample of OECD countries, the correlation of
the income elasticity with the growth rate of real GDP, investment and imports, as
measured by Spearmans rank correlation, a robust statistics (second to fourth column).
The correlation with the growth rate of GDP is, not surprisingly, negative for half of
the countries. At the other extreme there is the correlation with the growth rate of real
imports, which is positive for all the countries. The correlation with the growth rate
of real investment, which is una¤ected by the problems discussed above, is positive for
80% of the countries, with an average level of about 20%.
Analogously, for the full sample the correlation with the growth rate of real
investment is 22% and is positive for 84% of the countries. The latter is an intermediate
value between the 61% of countries that have a positive correlation with the growth
rate of real GDP and the 98% of countries that have a positive correlation with the
growth rate of real imports.
3.2 Some features of open economies
Table 2 describes some standard characteristics of import ows, unveiled by the lit-
erature on the international business cycle, which are conrmed in our sample. For
the restricted sample of OECD countries the growth rate of real imports is, in the
cross-country average, 3 times more volatile than that of real GDP (rst column). The
higher volatility of imports holds for about 90% the countries in our sample. Real
imports have a volatility broadly comparable to that of real investment: the standard
deviation of the latter (second column) is, in the cross-country average, 2:6 times higher
than that of GDP (third column).
If we turn to the full sample we nd that the growth rate of real imports is, in
the cross-country average, 3:6 times more volatile than that of real GDP, while real
investment are 4:3 times more volatile. For more than 90% of the countries real imports
are more volatile than real GDP, about the same percentage as for real investment.
The second half of Table 2 focuses on the correlations that, consistently with those
of Table 1, are still computed referring to the growth rates of the relevant variables.
As the presence of outliers is minimal for growth rates (as opposed to elasticities), we
report both the linear and the rank correlation (measured, respectively, by Pearsons
and Spearmans coe¢ cients).
For the OECD countries, the correlation between the volumes of imports and
GDP is equal to over 60% in the cross-country average (fourth and fth column of Table
2), slightly lower than the correlation between investment and GDP (over 70%; sixth
and seventh column). The correlation between the volumes of imports and GDP is,
in particular, positive for essentially all countries (97% when measured by the Pearson
coe¢ cient and 100% when measured by the Spearman coe¢ cient), similarly to what
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Table 2: Features of import, investment and GDP volumes
OECD countries: Imports Investment lin. rank lin. rank lin. rank
Australia 4.9 3.8 0.02 62.7 57.1 79.4 76.6 78.2 73.2
Austria 3.3 2.5 0.02 62.9 52.1 51.9 57.8 62.0 50.4
Belgium 2.8 3.8 0.01 85.2 80.4 74.1 71.6 69.4 69.8
Canada 3.1 2.7 0.02 80.1 73.7 76.7 64.6 69.9 57.9
Chile 0.9 1.0 0.16 29.3 81.9 55.9 70.7 78.5 78.0
Czech Republic 2.5 2.0 0.03 78.8 81.1 88.6 90.2 68.3 69.5
Denmark 2.6 3.6 0.02 76.7 62.9 82.3 78.6 69.1 63.4
Estonia 2.2 2.7 0.06 78.2 67.0 84.3 75.9 81.1 72.0
Finland 2.0 2.7 0.03 83.6 76.0 64.4 74.6 66.6 72.2
France 1.3 1.9 0.04 56.7 72.8 96.8 81.0 63.8 76.3
Germany 0.6 1.2 0.08 17.8 72.5 97.4 86.6 32.0 70.3
Greece 2.3 3.1 0.04 67.7 60.0 85.7 82.5 73.1 74.0
Hungary 2.6 1.9 0.03 60.2 57.9 66.2 64.7 60.0 61.5
Iceland 3.3 4.8 0.03 60.3 58.8 63.6 58.1 90.1 90.6
Ireland 1.8 2.7 0.04 78.7 80.8 79.9 81.2 66.7 69.0
Israel 3.1 4.3 0.02 65.7 71.1 52.2 66.2 62.1 68.7
Italy 3.3 2.4 0.02 82.0 79.8 85.6 80.0 79.5 66.8
Japan 2.9 1.9 0.03 65.4 50.6 90.3 82.2 71.9 61.7
Korea 2.3 1.8 0.06 84.0 70.4 82.3 83.6 82.1 71.3
Latvia 2.2 2.8 0.07 28.2 22.0 70.9 50.5 50.8 54.7
Luxembourg 1.7 3.3 0.03 65.1 62.9 53.1 46.6 42.3 44.1
Mexico 0.2 0.1 0.90 76.3 79.6 89.1 85.5 87.4 81.3
Netherlands 2.2 2.6 0.02 77.4 72.9 74.3 65.2 67.2 63.4
New Zealand 3.3 3.8 0.02 63.1 59.8 78.9 81.2 73.5 68.6
Norway 2.8 3.6 0.02 55.4 48.1 41.2 40.8 59.1 61.6
Poland 20.1 2.0 0.04 -65.9 14.7 73.5 78.9 -23.9 29.2
Portugal 2.9 3.0 0.03 83.4 80.2 87.0 90.3 84.7 83.2
Slovak Republic 2.7 3.3 0.03 66.1 53.1 60.7 47.5 69.7 67.8
Slovenia 2.4 2.9 0.03 87.5 69.6 84.3 73.8 78.4 68.5
Spain 3.6 3.0 0.02 85.1 81.1 92.5 90.8 88.2 81.6
Sweden 2.5 2.6 0.02 59.7 54.6 71.9 64.2 74.5 70.1
Switzerland 2.9 2.3 0.02 55.4 61.9 78.6 78.0 50.5 54.6
Turkey 3.7 3.1 0.04 78.4 75.5 88.8 85.6 74.7 73.4
United Kingdom 0.6 1.7 0.08 48.5 59.0 97.6 57.8 54.3 61.2
United States 1.4 1.6 0.05 37.3 78.2 91.0 89.1 62.5 75.0
Summary statistics: OECD countries
Mean 3.0 2.6 0.06 62.2 65.1 76.9 72.9 66.2 67.3
Median 2.6 2.7 0.03 65.7 69.6 79.4 76.6 69.4 69.0
Min 0.2 0.1 0.01 -65.9 14.7 41.2 40.8 -23.9 29.2
Max 20.1 4.8 0.90 87.5 81.9 97.6 90.8 90.1 90.6
% >0 100 100 100 97 100 100 100 97 100
% >1 89 94 - - - - - - -
Summary statistics: full sample (161 countries)
Mean 3.6 4.3 0.09 42.7 44.1 53.0 52.5 54.3 53.7
Median 2.9 3.3 0.05 42.2 43.3 58.9 55.9 61.6 57.9
Min 0.1 0.1 0.01 -65.9 -47.8 -33.1 -18.7 -79.0 -60.0
Max 20.1 51.4 1.33 97.7 92.7 99.2 95.5 93.8 93.8
% >0 100 100 100 89 96 93 97 97 98
% >1 90 92 - - - - - - -
Imports-GDP Investment-GDP Imports-Investment
Correlations:
Standard deviation
relative to that of GDP
Standard
deviation
of GDP
Source: authorscalculations on IMF annual data from 1970 to 2015.11
is observed for the correlation between investment and GDP volumes. Table 2 also
reports, for completeness, the linear and rank correlation between real imports and
real investment, which are close to 70% for the average of OECD countries and are
positive for virtually all of them (last two columns).
The full sample shows that the correlation between the volumes of imports and
GDP is equal to over 40% for the cross-country median (with both Pearsons and
Spearmans coe¢ cients), somewhat lower than the over 50% recorded for the correlation
between investment and GDP volumes (again with both measures). The former is,
however, positive for about 90% of the countries in the sample.
4 A simple theoretical framework
In this section, we present two variants of a simple theoretical model, based on Bems,
Johnson and Yi (2013). We rst consider a one-sector model in which all goods are
tradeables. In this model, a prototype for traditional studies on international trade,
the value of the income elasticity can di¤er from 1 only to the extent that the trade-
to-income ratio grows or falls, for example as a result of decreasing or increasing trade
barriers. We then extend the previous model to include the non-tradeable-goods sector.
This extensions shows that the higher volatility of imports with respect to GDP and
their procyclicality cause the income elasticity to be higher than 1 even in the absence
of any long-run trend in trade ows and income (and, therefore, in the trade-to-income
ratio). Moreover, if trade ows and income have a positive long-run trend  and
irrespectively of whether this trend is common or not (i.e. irrespectively of any trend
in the trade-to-income ratio)  then the value taken by the income elasticity depends
on business cycle conditions.
4.1 One-sector model
Let us assume that the volume of goods imported from the source country i by the
destination country n at time t, min;t, takes the CES form:
min;t =

 in;t  pi;t
Pn;t
 
Dn;t , (1)
where  in;t  1 is the iceberg cost of delivering one unit of good from country i to
country n at time t, pi;t is the factory-gate price of the goods produced in country
i at time t, Pn;t is the aggregate price level of country n, Dn;t is the real aggregate
expenditure of country n, and  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent
goods. We assume that trade is balanced, so that income and expenditure coincide
and there are no transfers between countries. By taking log-variations, equation (1)
becomes:
m^in;t =    ^ in;t    

p^i;t   P^n;t

+ D^n;t . (2)
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The income elasticity of country n at time t, n;t, is dened as the ratio between
the percentage change of its imports and the percentage change of its aggregate income.
Using a log approximation, we can write:
n;t 
m^in;t
D^n;t
= 1   ^ in;t
D^n;t
  

p^i;t   P^n;t

D^n;t
, for D^n;t 6= 0 , (3)
where the condition D^n;t 6= 0 grants that the elasticity exists and is nite.
Equation (3) provides two interesting insights about the income elasticity. First,
it shows that, in a steady state in which trade barriers and relative prices are constant,
the income elasticity is equal to 1: in other words, changes in aggregate income always
translate into proportional changes in imports. Second, although the level of trade
barriers does not a¤ect the trade elasticity, changes in trade barriers do. Thus, by
ignoring all the short run uctuations of relative prices (i.e. p^i;t = P^n;t) and by assuming
a positive trend for the aggregate income (D^n;t > 0), equation (3) shows that a trade
liberalization and/or a decline in transportation costs (^ in;t < 0) will add a positive
wedge to the income elasticity ( ^ in;t=D^n;t > 0). Clearly, this positive e¤ect fades
out when the liberalization process stalls and turns negative in the case, for example,
of a resurgence of trade protectionism.
4.2 Two-sector model
Absent changes in trade costs and relative prices, the one-sector model returns a uni-
tary income elasticity, because changes in aggregate demand translate one-to-one into
changes in imports. Key to this result is the fact that the composition of income does
not matter. In reality, however, the composition of income di¤ers from the composition
of imports in one important respect: trade ows are much more intensive in manufac-
turing goods (from the point of view of the supply composition) and capital goods
(demand composition).11 As the output of manufacturing goods and capital goods is,
in turn, much more volatile than the output of non-manufacturing goods and consump-
tion goods, it turns out that imports are more volatile than GDP, as documented in
the previous section.
In order to assess how the di¤erent composition of trade ows and GDP a¤ect
the income elasticity, the benchmark one-sector model is then extended to incorporate
also the non-tradeable goods sector, with preferences across goods taking a nested CES
form. We assume that the goods of sector M are tradeable and those of sector S are
non-tradeable and, for the sake of simplicity, we refer to the former as manufacturing
goods and to the latter as services.
11See Eaton and Kortum (2001), Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar (2010), Engel and Wang (2011),
Bussière, Callegari, Ghironi, Sestieri and Yamano (2013), and Constantinescu, Mattoo and Ruta
(2014).
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As in Bems, Johnson and Yi (2013), for each sector j 2 fM;Sg of country n, the
demand for domestic and foreign goods, dnn;t(j) and din;t(j), are aggregated to form a
composite sector-level good, denoted by dn;t(j). These sector-level goods dn;t(M) and
dn;t(S), in turn, can be further aggregated into a composite nal good, denoted by
Dn;t.
We focus only on the e¤ects of the di¤erent demand composition by making two
additional simplifying assumptions: (i) within each sector, changes in demand across
domestic and foreign varieties are symmetric (i.e. d^nn;t(j) = d^in;t(j)); (ii) trade costs
and relative prices are constant.
In this framework, the income elasticity of country n becomes:
n;t 
d^n;t(M)
D^n;t
=
d^n;t(M)
!n;t(M)  d^n;t(M) + !n;t(S)  d^n;t(S)
, for D^n;t 6= 0 , (4)
where d^n;t(j) is the log-change of the demand for the goods of sector j for country n
at time t, !n;t(j) 2 [0; 1] is the weight of sector j on the total expenditure of country
n at time t (where !n;t(M) = 1  !n;t(S)).
Equation (4) shows that, in general, the income elasticity is no longer equal to 1,
unless manufacturing goods and services change in exactly the same way at any time t.
We now use this equation to analyze what happens to the income elasticity, when we
add in specic hypotheses about the procyclicality, the volatility and the trend growth
rates of the volumes of manufacturing goods and services.
Let us start from assuming that there is no long-run trend in the growth of
manufacturing goods and services and that the two sectors di¤er only in the volatility
of their output, which is higher for the former sector. In addition, to keep things
as simple as possible, we assume that shocks are perfectly correlated across the two
sectors. Hence, if we let "t be the shock hitting the economy at time t, we assume that:(
d^n;t(M) =   "t
d^n;t(S) = "t
,
where   1 reects the higher volatility of the demand for tradeable goods. The
income elasticity then becomes:
n;t =

   !n;t(S)  (   1) , for "t 6= 0 , (5)
where the condition "t 6= 0 is necessary to ensure that income growth is not nil and
that the elasticity is properly dened.
Despite its simplicity, equation (5) yields three important implications. First,
it shows that the income elasticity depends not only on the trend growth of imports
relative to GDP, but also on the relative volatility of these two variables. In particular,
if output in the manufacturing sector is more volatile than output in the services sector
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(which implies that imports are more volatile than GDP), then the income elasticity is
greater than 1 (i.e. n;t > 1,  > 1). Second, the larger is the di¤erence in volatility
between the two sectors, the higher is the elasticity (i.e. n;t is increasing in ). Third,
a larger share of non-tradeables in nal demand yields a larger income elasticity (i.e.
n;t increasing in !n;t(S)).
The intuition behind the last result is that the dynamics of imports and income
di¤er along the business cycle because of the presence of low-volatility non-tradeable
goods. If imports and income, instead, converge  for example because the weight of
tradeable goods tends to 1 or because its volatility tends to that of services  then the
elasticity returns to 1. Notice, in fact, that the income elasticity is 1 when there are
no services (!n;t(S) = 0 and !n;t(M) = 1, assumptions that bring the model back to
one-sector) or when manufacturing goods and services have the same volatility ( = 1).
We now introduce a long-run trend growth for the two sectors and, for the sake of
simplicity, we assume that this is the same for both sectors, so that the trade-to-income
ratio is stable over time. Hence, we set:(
d^n;t(M) = g +   "t
d^n;t(S) = g + "t
,
where g  0 is the long-run trend growth.
Under these assumptions the elasticity becomes:
n;t =
g +   "t
g + [   !n;t(S)  (   1)]  "t , for "t 6= "t , (6)
where "t =  g= [   !n;t(S)  (   1)].
The north-west panel of Figure 2 shows the behavior of n;t from equation (6)
as a function of "t, for g = 2% and g = 4% and with  = 2. The most important
nding is that n;t now depends on "t. For "t = "t the elasticity is not dened and, in
a neighborhood of this value, it takes very high values (for "t < "t) or very low values
(for "t > "t). Notice that the elasticity is procyclical both in ( 1; "t) and in ("t;+1),
as it is increasing in "t in those two intervals, but it is not procyclical across the whole
domain of the cyclical shock. Similarly, notice that the elasticity is greater than 1 over
almost the entire domain of the cyclical shock, except that in the right neighborhood
of "t (that is for "t 2 ("t; 0]). At "t = 0, in particular, the elasticity is equal to one;
more precisely, absent the cyclical shock the elasticity only depends on the relative
trend growth of manufacturing and services, which we have assumed to be equal to 1.
It is worth examining the north-west panel of Figure 2 also to understand, in
light of equations (5) and (6), what happens when the common trend growth rate of
manufacturing and services converges to zero. As g goes to zero, the two branches of the
hyperbole get closer, the vertical asymptote eventually wanes and the function becomes
an horizontal line, set at the value given by equation (5). In other words, absent the
trend in the volumes of manufacturing and services, the cyclicality disappears and the
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elasticity stabilizes at a constant level, which is larger than 1. Thus, the presence of a
positive trend growth in volumes is necessary for the cyclicality of the elasticity, just
like the procyclicality of imports and their high volatility.
The north-east panel of Figure 2 zooms on values of the cyclical shock larger that
 2%. This is a realistic lower bound for the world economy: the lowest value in our
sample for world GDP growth is, in fact,  0:5%. In this branch of the hyperbole, to
higher values of "t, which determine higher GDP growth, correspond greater values of
the income elasticity. In other words, n;t tends to be procyclical.
Figure 2: Income elasticity and cyclical shocks: the model and the data (1)
(1) The north-west and north-east panel show the values of n;t (vertical axes) from equation
(6), for di¤erent values of "t (horizontal axes), for g = 2% (red line) and g = 4% (blue line),
with  = 2. The south-west (south-east) panel shows, for the U.S. (world economy), the
values of the income elasticity (vertical axes) for values of the cyclical component of real
GDP growth (horizontal axes). The south-east panel excludes a single outlier (2008-Q4),
when the estimated cyclical shock was  1% and the elasticity was 109.
Source: our elaborations on IMF data and simulated data.
Figure 2 provides also a rst visual comparison between the implications of the
model (that are in the upper half of the gure) and the data (lower half).12 The south-
west panel shows for the Unites States  the worlds largest economy  the behavior
12Appendix A tests another prediction of the model concerning the fact that the cyclicality of the
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of the income elasticity with respect to the cyclical component of real GDP growth.13
Despite the restrictive assumptions made in the theoretical framework, the two arms
of the hyperbole that are apparent in U.S. data match quite well those of the model
simulations. Similarly, the south-east panel shows the behavior of the income elasticity
with respect to the cyclical component of real GDP growth for the world economy.
Again, the match between the model simulations and the data emerges neatly.
5 Some empirical implications
In this section we focus on the implications of the model about two important questions.
We rst analyze cross-country di¤erences in the income elasticity, focusing on the role
played by the size of the non-tradeable-goods sector. We then turn to the analysis
of the behavior over time of the income elasticity of the world economy, in order to
provide an interpretation of the recent weakness of global trade.
5.1 Cross-country di¤erences
Almost 50 years ago, in their pioneering contribution, Houthakker and Magee (1969)
noted that advanced economies tended to have higher income elasticities than emerging
economies.14 Do those di¤erences persist today? And, in case, what factors determine
them? The empirical and theoretical results of the previous two sections provide some
new insights about these important questions.
Let us start by splitting the full sample of 161 countries between advanced
economies (37 countries) and non-advanced economies (124): the average elasticity
is 1:9 for the former group and 1:4 for the latter. Similarly, the median elasticity is 2:0
for the advanced countries and 1:3 for the remaining countries. Thus, the di¤erences
between the two groups of economies seem to persist today.
In the previous literature, di¤erences in income elasticities between advanced
and non-advanced economies could only be explained by cross-country heterogeneities
either in the trend growth of imports relative to GDP or in the composition of imports
between, for example, primary and non-primary goods. Our theoretical section o¤ers,
instead, some interesting insights about other possible causes for these di¤erences. For
example, the degree of volatility of imports and the extent of their procyclicality are
two candidate variables. Here, however, we focus on the peculiar role played by the
income elasticity emerges when imports and GDP have a positive long-run trend growth. Results
show that this prediction is conrmed by the data.
13The cyclical component of real GDP growth is derived by applying an HP lter on quarterly data.
We defer to Section 5, where we produce further analysis on quarterly data, the description of the
details on the ltering procedure.
14See, in particular, Table 3 in Houthakker and Magee (1969).
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Table 3: Income elasticity and size of the non-tradeable-goods sector
Share of non-
tradeables in GDP
Mean elasticity:
static effect
Mean elasticity:
dynamic effect
99% 4.81 1.30
95% 4.17 1.28
90% 3.57 1.26
85% 3.13 1.24
80% 2.78 1.22
(1) Values of the income elasticity for di¤erent weights of the non-tradeable goods sector. In
the second column it is assumed a nil trend growth in both the non-tradeable goods sector
and in GDP (static e¤ect). In the third column the weight of the non-tradeable goods sector
declines (dynamic e¤ect), as a result of a trend growth in the tradeable-goods sector higher
than that in GDP (4.8% against 3.4% per year).
size of the non-tradeable goods sector, which exerts two distinct e¤ects on the income
elasticity.
The rst, discussed above, suggests that countries with a larger non-tradeable-
goods sector have, ceteris paribus, a greater elasticity, because this is the sector that,
due to the lower volatility of its output, makes imports di¤er from GDP. This "static
e¤ect" is contrasted by a "dynamic e¤ect", which has the opposite sign: countries in
which the size of the tradeable goods sector rises (i.e. the non-tradeable-goods sector
shrinks) are also countries in which imports tend to increase relative to GDP, raising
the income elasticity. Thus, to a larger non-tradeable-goods sector should correspond
a greater elasticity (static e¤ect), but a growing non-tradeable goods sector should
reduce the elasticity (dynamic e¤ect).
To shed some further light on these two e¤ects, Table 3 presents the result of
two exercises. For di¤erent sizes of the non-tradeable-goods sector reported in the rst
column, the second column shows the values of the income elasticity, assuming that
the trend growth rates of imports and GDP are both nil. Consistently with equation
(5), to a smaller size of the non-tradeable-goods sector corresponds a lower income
elasticity. The third column assumes, instead, a positive trend growth in the tradeable
goods sector, equal to 4:8% per year, a value which is 1:4 percentage points higher
than the one set for GDP growth and reports the values of the income elasticity as the
size of the non-tradeable-goods sector decreases due to the di¤erence in the two growth
rates. Notice that, as the weight of the non-tradeable-goods sector on GDP shrinks,
the income elasticity still declines, but, with respect to the static case, the e¤ect is very
much attenuated.
To check whether the size of the non-tradeable-goods sector contributes to de-
termine the income elasticity in our extended sample of countries, we approximate the
former with the size of the services sector (i.e. with its share in GDP). We then run
a simple regression, with the income elasticity as a dependent variable and the share
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of services as independent variable. Results show that the coe¢ cient has the expected
positive sign and is signicant at the 5% threshold (with a p-value of 1:4%).
5.2 The dynamics of global trade
The theoretical and empirical results of the previous sections indicate that the behavior
of the income elasticity over time is a¤ected by business cycle conditions as well as by
the trend growth of imports relative to GDP. We now attempt to disentangle the role
played by these two factors, focusing on the recent weakness of global trade.
For this purpose, we consider quarterly data on real imports and real GDP for
the world economy from the rst quarter of 1971 to the fourth quarter of 2015 and set
up the following procedure. We rst use an HP lter to retrieve the trend, the cycle
and the noise component separately for imports and GDP.15 Note that we consider,
together with the standard trend and cycle component, also a noise component, due
to the measurement error that typically a¤ects import and export data. This error is
such that these two variables, which should always coincide at the world level, often
display signicant di¤erences in the data, even though these di¤erences usually cancel
out over time.16
We then construct two quarterly series: (i) a "trend component" of the income
elasticity, by dividing the growth rate of the trend component of real imports by the
growth rate of the trend component of real GDP; (ii) a "trend-plus-cycle" component
of the income elasticity, as the ratio between the sums of the growth rates of the trend
and the cycle components of real imports at the numerator, and the sums of growth
rates of the trend and the cycle components of real GDP at the denominator.17 We
do not lter directly the income elasticity because the model suggests that its long-run
trend and cyclicality are just the by-product of the long-run trend and cyclicality of
imports and GDP.
The theoretical model suggests that the trend component of the income elasticity
should be related to trade barriers and that, absent changes in their levels, it should
converge to an equilibrium value of 1. Figure 3 shows that this component of the
income elasticity (red line), which had gradually risen until the second half of 1990s,
is now returning towards its equilibrium level. This behavior is presumably due to the
fact that the secular decline of tari¤s, information and transportation costs that has
supported global trade until the late 1990s is currently fading. The cyclical component
 which is conveniently added to the trend component in Figure 3 (blue line)  is
15More specically, we use the HP lter in two stages. In the rst stage we extract the trend
component of real imports and real GDP by using as a multiplier  = 16; 000. In the second stage we
separate the cycle component from a noise component, using as a multiplier  = 10.
16Footnote 2 provides further details on this issue.
17We take a log approximation to measure growth rates, in order to preserve additivity; see Appendix
A for the details.
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Figure 3: Decomposition of the income elasticity of word trade (1)
(1) Quarterly data, 4-quarter moving averages. The picture excludes three consecutive out-
liers, from 2008-Q4 to 2009-Q2. (2) Trend component of the income elasticity from HP
ltered series. (3) "Trend+cycle" component of the income elasticity from HP ltered series.
Source: our elaborations on OECD, NIESR and ECB data.
instead related to strength of business conditions. Our results then show that also this
component is currently contributing to depress trade, bringing the income elasticity
below 1.
The reason why also the cyclical component has contributed negatively to global
trade is claried in Figure 4. World real GDP growth, which has been on a downward
trend since the outset of the global recession (red line), is currently running below its
trend (blue line), weakening the income elasticity due to the mechanisms described in
the previous sections.
These results provide some ground to speculate about the future of global trade.
In particular, Figure 3 suggest that the trend component of the income elasticity may
not recover soon and may be bound to lie around 1 for some time, unless new impetus
come from further trade liberalizations or from a new breakthrough in transportation
or other non-tari¤ costs. Nevertheless, the exceptional weakness of global trade ob-
served since 2011, which has brought the income elasticity below 1, is also the result of
lackluster business conditions. Therefore, one should expect that, as real GDP growth
returns to its trend, global trade growth recovers more strongly, with the income elas-
ticity rst returning towards 1 and then, presumably, exceeding this value, once that
real GDP goes above its own trend growth.
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Figure 4: Decomposition of word real GDP growth (1)
(1) Percentage points, quarterly data, 4-quarter moving averages. (2) Trend component of
world GDP growth from HP ltered series. (3) "Trend+cycle" component of world GDP
growth from HP ltered series.
Source: our elaborations on OECD, NIESR and ECB data.
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the income elasticity of trade is a¤ected by business cycle
conditions. In particular, in a neighborhood of the long-run growth rate of real imports
and real GDP, the elasticity tends to be lower when business conditions are weak. A
similar prediction arises for both positive rates of real GDP growth and, separately, for
negative rates, although not across the full spectrum of growth rates. This overlooked
property of the income elasticity, which emerges when trade volumes and real GDP
have a positive trend growth, is the result of two standard features of trade ows: their
high volatility and their procyclicality.
Our analysis also provides an interpretation of the recent weakness of interna-
tional trade. By computing a trend and a cycle component of the income elasticity, as
suggested by the theory, results show that the former has been decreasing to 1, most
likely because the secular decline of trade barriers has been gradually fading away in the
last 15 years. At the same time, however, the weakness of global trade observed since
2011, which has brought the income elasticity below 1, is also the result of lackluster
business conditions.
By focusing on a simple theoretical framework, we have been able to derive a
useful analytical expression for the income elasticity. We have, however, neglected the
role of changes in relative prices as well as the precise sources of the cyclical shocks
(whether, for example, they hit preferences or technologies). Thus, further research is
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needed to prove that the cyclicality of the income elasticity carries over also in a fully
general equilibrium setting.
Future research is also needed for a more extensive analysis about the causes of
the cross-country disparities observed in the income elasticity. While we have provided
suggestive evidence about the key role played by the size of the non-tradeable goods
sector, any in-depth empirical study should also consider more traditional factors, such
as the trend growth of imports relative to GDP and the composition of trade ows,
as well as other factors identied in this paper  such as the degree of volatility of
imports and the extent of their procyclicality.
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Appendix
A A test on the cyclicality of the elasticity
One important implication of the theoretical model is that the cyclicality of the income
elasticity emerges when import and GDP volumes have a positive trend growth, but it
is not necessarily present when their trend growth is nil.18 We can test this implication
on a restricted sample of 38 countries, for which we have quarterly data on real imports
and real GDP from the rst quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 2015.19
We apply to each country the same type of ltering described in Section 5; namely,
we retrieve the trend, the cycle and the noise component separately for real imports
and for real GDP.20 Then we compute, for each country, two quarterly series: (i) a
"cycle component" of the income elasticity, by dividing the growth rate of the cycle
component of real imports by the growth rate of the cycle component of real GDP;
(ii) a "trend-plus-cycle" component, as the ratio between the sums of growth rates of
the trend and the cycle components of real imports at the numerator and the sums of
growth rates of the trend and the cycle components of real GDP at the denominator.
The rationale for this methodology is the following. It is assumed that the total
imports of country n at time t are given by the product of the di¤erent components,
that is: In;t = ITn;t  ICn;t  INn;t, where the superscripts T , C and N denote, respectively,
trend, cycle and noise. By taking a log-approximation, the growth rate of imports can
then be written as:
 ln In;t =  ln I
T
n;t + ln I
C
n;t + ln I
N
n;t .
By making the same assumptions for the GDP of country n at time t, denoted by Yn;t,
the trend, cycle and "trend+cycle" component of the income elasticity can be written,
respectively, as:
Tn;t =
 ln ITn;t
 lnY Tn;t
; Cn;t =
 ln ICn;t
 lnY Cn;t
, TCn;t =
 ln ITn;t + ln I
C
n;t
 ln ITn;t + ln I
C
n;t
.
For each country, we can now consider the correlation between the cycle com-
ponent of imports  our preferred indicator for the business conditions  and the
18The assumption that the positive trend growth rates of imports and GDP are identical is not
necessary: it is easy to check that the income elasticity would be a¤ected by business cycle conditions
even if the two trend growth rates were di¤erent.
19This is the set of countries considered by the ECB (2015), for its macroeconomic projections.
20The same discrepancies between import and export data that are present at the world level and
that have induced us to compute a noise component (in addition to the trend and the cycle) are also
present at the country level, as shown by the well-known discrepancies between bilateral import and
bilateral export data.
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Table 4: Correlations of the cycle component of the income elasticity with di¤erent
components of the growth rate of imports (1)
trend+cycle cycle trend+cycle cycle
% > 0.25 92 38 % > 0.25 79 5
% > 0.33 92 18 % > 0.33 72 5
% > 0.50 82 3 % > 0.50 46 0
% > 0.66 59 0 % > 0.66 31 0
% > 0.75 44 0 % > 0.75 21 0
A. Rank correlation B. Linear correlation
(1) Correlations of the cycle component of the income elasticity with di¤erent components of
imports, indicated in the rst row, from HP ltered series. The table shows the percentage
of countries with correlations higher than those reported in the rst column.
corresponding component of the income elasticity. As both imports and GDP data
have been cleared by any noise, we can consider both the linear and the rank corre-
lations. The theory suggests that, if there is no trend growth in imports and GDP,
the income elasticity and business conditions are not necessarily correlated. Table 4
shows, in fact, that the cycle component of the income elasticity and the cycle com-
ponent of imports are only weekly correlated (despite the latter being the numerator
of the former): only 38% of the countries have a rank correlation that is signicantly
di¤erent from zero (i.e., given the size of our sample, above 25%); similarly, using
Pearsons coe¢ cient, we nd that only 5% of the countries have a linear correlation
signicantly di¤erent from zero. The theory also suggests that correlation between
the income elasticity and business conditions should instead emerge when there is a
positive trend growth in imports and GDP. In fact, when we consider both the trend
and the cycle components of imports, the rank and linear correlation with the cycle
component of the income elasticity are signicantly larger than zero for 92% and 79%
of the countries, conrming the prediction of the model.
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